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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for the Utah Court of Appeals to hear this 
appeal is conferred by Utah Code Ann,, §78-2a-3(2)(b) (1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court err in granting defendants' Rule 
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff F.O.P. 
because it based that ruling on erroneous factual findings and 
incorrect conclusions of law and because it applied the appellate 
standing test? The trial court's findings of fact that underlie 
its ruling are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (1987); Christensen v. Munns, 
812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah Ct.App. 1991); Horton v. Gem State Mut. of 
Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct.App. 1990); Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). 
In order to successfully challenge the trial court's findings of 
tact, plaintiffs must first marshall the evidence supporting the 
findings and then demonstrate that the findings are nonetheless 
clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Magestic, 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah Ct.App. 1991); Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73 
(Utah Ct.App. 1991) ; Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 
783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). The trial court's 
conclusions of law with respect to subject matter jurisdiction 
are reviewed independently for correctness and no deference is 
given to the trial court. Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 190 
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U.A.R. 48, 48f P.2d (Utah Ct.App. 1992); Lopez v. 
Career Service Review Boardf 188 U.A.R. 19, 20, P.2d 
(Utah Ct.App. 1992); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 
1033 (Utah 1989). F.O.P., as an association, had standing to 
bring this action under Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis 
County Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985); Society of 
Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987). 
Assuming, arguendo, that F.O.P. did not meet the traditional 
standing criteria, F.O.P. should have been granted standing under 
the alternative standing tests enunciated in Jenkins v. Swan, 675 
P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983); accord, Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442 
(Utah 1978); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 
451 (Utah 1985) . The appellate standing test does not apply in 
this case. Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 
P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah 1987). 
B. Did the trial court err in granting defendants' Rule 
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff Crowley 
because it based that ruling on erroneous factual findings and 
incorrect conclusions of law? The trial court's findings of fact 
that underlie its ruling are reviewed under the "clearly 
erroneous" standard. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (1987); 
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah Ct.App. 1991); Horton 
v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct.App. 1990); 
Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah 
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Ct.App. 1989) . An appellant may demonstrate the clear error of 
factual findings only after marshalling the evidence that 
supports the finding. West Valley City v. Majesticy 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.App. 1991); Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 
69, 73 (Utah Ct.App. 1991); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. 
Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). The trial court's 
conclusions of law are accorded no deference and are reviewed for 
correctness. Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 190 U.A.R. 48, 48, 
P.2d (Utah Ct.App. 1992); Lopez v. Career Service 
Board, 188 U.A.R. 19, 20, P.2d (Utah Ct.App. 1992); 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
Crowley has standing in this action because he satisfied the 
traditional standing test by demonstrating, through the Corrected 
Amended Complaint and affidavits of record that he suffered a 
distinct and palpable injury caused by defendants that gave him a 
personal stake in the outcome of this action. Jenkins v. Swan, 
675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983). 
C. Did the trial court err when it determined that it did 
not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action and 
therefore denied plaintiffs1 and proposed co-plaintiffs1 motion 
for joinder because it was moot? Joinder of co-plaintiffs in an 
action is permissive under Utah Rule of Procedure 20 and within 
the trial court's discretion. Denial of the motion for joinder, 
as with other discretionary matters is reviewed under an abuse of 
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discretion standard. Seftel v. Capital City Banky 767 P. 2d 941 
(Utah Ct.App. 1989)(indispensible parties under Rule 19); Tolman 
v. Salt Lake County, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). Joinder 
was not a moot issue in this case because plaintiffs had standing 
and the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES; 
Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1002 (1977): 
The classified civil service shall consist of all 
places of employment now existing or hereafter created 
in or under the police department and the fire 
department of each city of the first and second class, 
and the health department in cities of the first class, 
except the head of the departments, deputy chiefs of 
the police and fire departments and assistant chiefs of 
the police department in cities of the first and second 
class, and the members of the board of health of the 
departments. No appointments to any of the places of 
employment constituting the classified civil service in 
the departments shall be made except according to law 
and under the rules and regulations of the Civil 
Service Commission. The head of each of the 
departments may, and the deputy chiefs of the police 
and fire departments and assistant chiefs of the police 
department shall, be appointed from the classified 
civil service, and upon the expiration of his term or 
upon the appointment of a successor shall be returned 
thereto. 
Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1003 (1977): 
In each city of the first and second class there 
shall be a civil service commission, consisting of 
three members appointed by the board of commissioners. 
Their term of office shall be six years, but they shall 
be appointed so that the term of office of one member 
shall expire on the 30th day of June of each 
even-numbered year. If a vacancy occurs in the civil 
service commission, it shall be filled by appointment 
by the board of city commissioners for the unexpired 
term. 
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Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1007 (1977): 
All applicants for employment in the classified civil 
service shall be subject to examination, which shall be 
public, competitive and free. Examinations shall be 
held at such times and places as the civil service 
commission shall from time to time determine, and shall 
be for the purpose of determining the qualifications of 
applicants for positions. Examinations shall be 
practical and shall fairly test the fitness in every 
respect of the persons examined to discharge the duties 
of the positions to which they seek to be appointed, 
and shall include tests of physical qualifications and 
health. 
Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1010 (1983): 
The civil service commission shall provide for 
promotion in the classified civil service on the basis 
of ascertained merit, seniority in service and standing 
obtained by competitive examination, and shall provide, 
in all cases where practicable, that vacancies shall be 
filled by promotion from the members of the next lower 
rank as submit themselves for the examination and 
promotion. The civil service commission shall certify 
to the appointing power the names of not more than five 
applicants having the highest rating for each 
promotion. 
Utah Code Ann. 
Utah Code Ann. 
Utah Code Ann. 
Utah Code Ann. 
§52-4-1 (1977) 
§52-4-3 (1977) 
§52-4-4 (1977) 
§52-4-5 (1977) 
(Please see Addendum for text) 
(Please see Addendum for text) 
(Please see Addendum for text) 
(Please see Addendum for text) 
PROCEDURAL RULES: 
Rule 20, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987): (Please see 
Addendum for text) 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1988): (Please see 
Addendum for text) 
RULES: 
Rule 1-6, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988): 
Any proposed amendments, additions or deletions to 
the West Valley City Civil Service Commission Rules and 
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Regulations shall be recommended to the Council by the 
City Manager after being submitted for consideration 
and adoption by majority vote of the Commission. The 
Council must disapprove the proposed amendment within 
60 days from the date of submission of the proposed 
amendment, or it is automatically approved. 
Rule 11-12, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988): 
All examiners selected by the Commission shall 
conduct examination under the supervision of the 
Personnel Officer and in accordance with such methods 
as the Commission shall prescribe. All examinations 
shall be impartial, fair and practical, and designed to 
test the relative qualifications and fitness of 
applicants to discharge duties of the particular 
position which they seek to fill. No question in any 
examination shall relate to the political, racial or 
religious convictions or affiliations of the applicant. 
Rule III-l, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988): 
The Commission shall provide for promotion in the 
Civil Service on the basis of ascertained merit, 
seniority in service and standing obtained by 
competitive examination, and shall provide, in all 
cases where practicable, that vacancies shall be filled 
by promotion from the members of the next lower rank as 
submit themselves for the examination and promotion. 
The Commission shall certify to the Chief from an 
eligibles list the names of not more than 5 applicants 
having the highest rating for each promotion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This appeal is taken from the final orders entered by the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis dismissing the action for lack of 
standing pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants 
and denying the Motion for Joinder for reasons of mootness. 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Plaintiffs/appellants, West Valley City Fraternal Order of 
Police Lodge No. 4 ("F.O.P.") and Jim Crowley ("Crowley") origi-
nally brought this action against defendants/appellees, West 
Valley Civil Service Merit Commission ("Commission") and Chief 
Dennis Nordfelt ("Nordfelt"), to set aside the results of the 
promotion examination process, including the written examination 
administered on July 20, 1989, utilized by the West Valley City 
Police Department ("Department") to determine which candidates 
from the Department would be eligible for promotion to the rank 
of sergeant. During the course of the proceedings, plaintiffs 
and additional F.O.P. members, David Shopay ("Shopay") and 
William Salmon ("Salmon"), filed a joint motion to join the 
action as co-plaintiffs [R. 216, 217, 330, 333]. Specifically, 
plaintiffs challenge the Court's Ruling [R. 428-430] and the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order [R. 
431-437], both entered on March 26, 1992. A handful of 
pleadings, including the trial court's original ruling, preceeded 
the March 26, 1992 orders challenged by this appeal; they are, in 
chronological order: 
(a) Court's [Initial] Ruling - signed 11/15/91 [R. 
411-413]; 
(b) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and 
Order - submitted by defendants on or about 11/23/91 (does not 
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appear in Record); 
(c) Plaintiffs1 Objections to Defendants1 Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order - filed 
by plaintiffs 12/6/91 [R. 422-427]; 
(d) Defendants1 Response to Plaintiffs1 Objection to 
Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Decision and Order - filed by defendants 12/18/92 [R. 414-419]; 
(e) (Second Draft) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, Decision and Order - submitted by defendants on or about 
12/18/91 (does not appear in Record); and 
(f) Notice to Submit for Decision - filed by plain-
tiffs 2/19/92 [R. 420-421]. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT: 
In the Court's Ruling (R. 428-430] and the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order [R. 431-437] the trial 
court granted defendants Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss based on 
the conclusion that plaintiffs F.O.P. lacked standing to bring 
the action and therefore the court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the action and denied the motion for joinder of 
additional co-plaintiffs reasoning that, absent subject matter 
jurisdiction, the motion was moot. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
F.O.P. is and was an association whose membership consisted 
of police officers and staff employed by the West Valley City 
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Police Department ("Department") [R. 113, 186, 337]. Crowley and 
proposed co-plaintiffs, Salmon and Shopay, are and were employed 
by the Department and were F.O.P. members (R. 113, 331, 334, 
337] . A major purpose of F.O.P, is to ensure fair and equal 
treatment of all lodge members in their employment, including 
promotions [R. 338]. 
The Commission is the body appointed pursuant to the pro-
visions of Utah Code Ann. , §10-3-1003 (1977) , and charged with 
the responsibilities of supplying classified civil service lists 
to the Department and of administering the merit civil service 
rules and regulations, as they apply to the Department and its 
employees, according to Part 10, Chapter 3, Utah Municipal Code 
(§§10-3-1001, et seq.) [R. 114, 192, 337]. Nordfelt is, and at 
the time of the events in question was, Chief of the Department 
[R. 113, 175]. 
On or about June 6, 1989, Nordfelt, by written memorandum 
[R. 6-7, 105-106] announced that a promotion examination was to 
be held to establish a roster from which an immediate opening and 
future promotions to the position of sergeant would be made [R. 
6-7, 105-106, 114]. 
Approximately one month later, the West Valley City Person-
nel Office issued a memorandum that, like the June 6, 1989, 
memorandum, stated only those candidates receiving the top 
fifteen scores on the written exam would advance to participate 
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in the "assessment center" portion of the promotion examination 
[R. 6-7, 8-9, 107-108, 114]. That memorandum also, by 
implication, indicated that "promotability" was also a part of 
the promotion examination process and stated that the "assessment 
center" and "promotability" would each be weighted 40% of the 
promotion examination and the written examination would be 
weighted 20% of the promotion examination [R. 9, 108]. 
Several F.O.P. members, including Crowley, Shopay and 
Salmon, participated in the promotion examination process and sat 
for the July 20, 1989 written exam [R. 331, 334, 338]. Of the 
approximately 4 0 officers who sat for the written examination, 
all were F.O.P. members [R. 337]. 
Although the trial court dismissed this action for lack of 
standing and did not address the merits of plaintiffs' alle-
gations [R. 429, 436-457], the interjection of a brief summary of 
plaintiffs1 claims may provide a useful backdrop before which 
additional jurisdictional facts may be presented: Plaintiffs' 
Corrected Amended Complaint alleged two principal improprieties 
occurred in the design and administration of the promotion 
examination and that those improprieties violated provisions of 
Utah Code Ann., §§10-3-1001 through 1013 (1977, as amended), the 
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act and provisions of the West 
Valley City Civil Service Policy and Procedures Manual 
("W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M.") [R. 113-118, 331-332, 334-335, 338]. 
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First, plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to include 
seniority in service as one of the criteria to be considered in 
the promotion process, thus violating Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1010 
(1983) and its similarly worded counterpart, Rule III-l, 
W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988) [R. 6-9, 113-118, 332, 335, 339]. This 
allegation was initially brought to the attention of the 
Commission by letter dated August 23, 1989, by Department 
officers who were also F.O.P. members [R. 10-12, 116, 332, 335, 
339]. They requested the Commission to review the promotion 
evaluation process and declare it invalid [R. 11, 116]. The 
Commission's rules and regulations did not provide method or 
means by which Department officers could object to or seek review 
of improprieties in the promotion examination process [R. 117, 
332, 335, 339]. Without conducting a formal hearing or convening 
a meeting to consider the allegations contained in the officers' 
August 23, 1989 letter, two Civil Service Commissioners, Guy 
Kimball and Don Meyers, signed a letter dated October 4, 1989, 
summarily dismissing the issues raised by the officers [R. 113, 
116]. A copy of that October 4, 1989 letter was delivered to an 
F.O.P. representative on November 2, 1989 [R. 116]. Plaintiffs 
allege the two Civil Service Commissioners' actions violated Utah 
Code Ann., §§52-4-1 et seq. (1977, as amended) [R. 116-118, 332, 
335, 358] . Second, plaintiffs alleged that defendants illegally 
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waived the requirement that promotions be made from the next 
lower rank, thus violating, for a second time, both Utah Code 
Ann,, §10-3-1010 (1983) and Rule III-l, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988), 
requiring, as applied to the Department, promotions to sergeant 
to be made from the next lower rank, Police Officer II ("P.O. 
II") [R. 110, 117-118, 293-295, 331-332, 334-335, 338]. The 
waiver of the next lower rank requirement was initiated by Chief 
Nordfelt on June 6, 1989, the same date the promotion examination 
was announced by Nordfelt, by memorandum addressed to the 
Commission requesting that". . . the restriction in the Civil 
Service requirements stating that officers applying for the 
position of Sergeant be of P.O. II rank, be waived." [R. 110, 
117, 293-295]. Within the rank and grade system utilized by the 
Department, the Police Officer I ("P.O. I") rank is lower than 
the P.O. II rank, and P.O. I officers are thus not eligible for 
promotion to sergeant [R. 292, 337]. Nordfelt's October 6, 1989 
letter was hand-delivered to Guy Kimball, Chairman of the 
Commission [R. 117, 294]. On or about that same day, Guy Kimball 
signed the letter and marked it "approved" [R. 110, 117, 
294-295]. The next lower rank requirement was thereby waived by 
a single Commissioner and without the Commission having held a 
formal hearing or convened a meeting to deliberate the issue [R. 
117-118, 294-295, 338]. Thus, officers of P.O. I rank were 
-12-
improperly allowed to participate in the promotion exam process 
to the detriment of the candidates of P.O. II rank [R. 117-118, 
331, 334, 338]. Plaintiffs allege Chairman Guy Kimball's action 
violated §52-4-1 et. seq. (1977, as amended) and Rule 1-6, 
W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M, (1988) [R. 116-118, 332, 335, 338]. In addition 
to the two principal improprieties giving rise to this action, 
plaintiffs made two related claims. They alleged that on or 
about October 4, 1989, when the two Commissioners, by letter [R. 
13], summarily dismissed the officers' complaints, the Commission 
consisted of only two members, and thus was not legally con-
stituted as required by Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1003 (1977) [R. 
117] , and they alleged the promotion examination process also 
violated Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1007 (1977) and Rule 11-12 
W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988) because some candidates were not allowed 
equal access to the study materials [R. 10-13, 117]. 
Approximately September 2, 1989, a roster was established 
pursuant to the procedures and weighting set forth in the July 7, 
1989 memorandum, and appointments to the position of sergeant 
were made [R. 8-9, 114, 186]. 
Crowley had been a Department officer since July, 1980, and 
had held the P.O. II rank since approximately 1981 [R. 113, 337]. 
At the time of the 198 9 promotion examination he enjoyed nine 
years' seniority [R. 338]. His seniority was not considered in 
the promotion examination process [R. 6-9, 338]. Crowley sat for 
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the written exam portion of the evaluation process but failed, by 
one point, to achieve one of the top fifteen scores [R. 7, 8-9, 
185, 338]. For that reason he was not allowed to participate in 
the other portion of the process [R. 7, 8-9, 107-108, 114, 185, 
338]. Crowley believes he would have been allowed to participate 
in the other portions of the evaluation process if his seniority 
had been considered [R. 115-116, 338]. Had Crowley been informed 
of Nordfelt's request to waive the next lower rank requirement, 
he would have objected, individually, and on behalf of F.O.P. to 
the waiver request [R. 110, 116, 338]. Crowley signed the August 
23, 1989 letter to the Commission in which several Department 
officers and F.O.P. members objected to the improprieties that 
marred the promotion examination [R. 116, 339] . Crowley is 
entitled to the protections and benefits conferred by the rules 
and regulations that comprise West Valley City's merit service 
system and state law [R. 114, 337]. 
Shopay had been a Department officer since November, 1980 
[R. 331]. At the time of the 1989 promotion examination he held 
the P.O. II rank, had eight years' seniority in the Department 
and met all other announced requirements [R. 6-7, 331]. His 
seniority was not considered in the promotion examination process 
[R. 6-9, 113-118, 331]. Shopay completed the entire promotion 
examination process and earned a position on the promotion roster 
IR. 331]. Shopay had more Department seniority than any 
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candidate assigned a higher position on the promotion roster [R. 
331] . By affidavit, Shopay alleged that even without 
consideration of his seniority he would have earned a higher 
position on the roster, the fourth position, if he had not been 
torced to compete with the P.O. I officers who were improperly 
allowed to participate in the promotion examination [R. 331-332]. 
Salmon had been a Department officer since December, 1982 
and was a P.O. II when he participated in the promotion 
examination [R.334]. He met all of the announced eligibility 
requirements [R. 6-7, 334]. He had six and one-half years1 
seniority with the Department, but it was not considered in the 
promotion process [R. 6-9, 113-118, 334]. Salmon completed the 
entire promotion examination process and earned a position on the 
roster [R. 334] . Three of the officers who preceded him on the 
roster held only the P.O. I rank [R. 334]. By affidavit, Salmon 
alleged that even without consideration of his seniority he would 
have earned a more favorable position, ninth, on the roster if he 
had not been forced to compete with P.O. I officers [R. 334-335]. 
As Department officers, both Shopay and Salmon were entitled 
to the protections and benefits of the W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. rules and 
regulations and state law in conjunction with the design and 
administration of the promotion examination [R. 114, 192, 331, 
334] . 
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As of the date of this appeal, neither Shopayf Salmon or 
Crowley has been promoted to the rank of sergeant [R. 186]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The dismissal, with respect to F.O.P., of this action 
because of the association's lack of standing was based on 
erroneous facts and incorrect legal conclusions. Although some 
support for the challeged findings may be found if the only 
factual examination made is of defendants' affidavits, a thorough 
review of the record proves the court's findings were clearly 
erroneous. That having been done, the facts contained in 
plaintiffs' pleadings and affidavits and elsewhere in the record 
provide a proper factual basis for the determination that F.O.P. 
had standing under the association standing test. The trial 
court also erroneously required F.O.P. to satisfy the "appellate 
standing" test. That test simply did not apply to F.O.P. in this 
action. However, assuming that it was applicable, once the trial 
court's erroneous findings of fact are ferretted out, F.O.P. can 
meet the test. The trial court's factual findings, the incorrect 
determination of F.O.P.'s standing and the resulting dismissal 
with respect to F.O.P. should be overturned. 
Plaintiffs' claims with respect to Crowley are similar and 
factually related to the F.O.P. arguments. Some of the trial 
court's findings bearing on Crowley are clearly erroneous. When 
the record is properly viewed and Crowley's allegations and 
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plaintiffs' affidavits are considered, ample factual support for 
Crowley's standing under the traditional standing test is 
apparent. The court's rulings, factual and legal, with respect 
to Crowley and his dismissal from the action should be reversed. 
The trial court's erroneous determinations that F.O.P. and 
Crowley lacked standing fostered an additional error. The trial 
court ruled that because plaintiffs lacked standing the court had 
no subject matter jurisdiction and the motion for joinder to add 
proposed co-plaintiffs Shopay and Salmon was therefore moot. 
Clearly, plaintiffs did have standing, and the motion was not 
moot. The trial court's determination of mootness should be 
reversed and the motion for joinder should be granted. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's dismissal of this action 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on defendants' Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss which asserted 
neither F.O.P. nor Crowley was possessed of sufficient standing 
to bring this action. 
A motion to dismiss is appropriate only where it 
clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would 
not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or 
under any state of facts they could prove to support 
their claim. ... In determining whether the trial 
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court properly granted the motion, we must accept the 
factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
those facts in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. ... 
Prows v. Department of Financial Insts., 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 
1991) (12(b) (6) motion, citations omitted); West v. Thompson 
Newspapers, 188 U.A.R. 31, 32, P.2d (Utah Ct.App. 1992); 
see also, Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1360 
(Utah Ct.App. 1991) . "The courts are a forum for settling 
controversies, and if there is any doubt about whether a claim 
should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the issue 
should be resolved in favor of giving the party an opportunity to 
present its proof." Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P. 2d 
622, 624 (Utah 1990) . 
The Utah Supreme Court commented on the function of the 
standing doctrine in Utah in Terracor v. Utah Board of State 
Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986): 
The doctrine of standing is intended to assure the 
procedural integrity of judicial adjudications by 
requiring that the parties to a lawsuit have sufficient 
interest in the subject matter of the dispute and 
sufficient adverseness that the legal and factual 
issues which must be resolved will be thoroughly 
explored. Unlike federal law where standing doctrine 
is related to the "case or controversy" language of 
Article III of the United States Constitution, our 
standing law arises from the general precepts of the 
doctrine of separation of powers found in Article V of 
the Utah Constitution. Under Utah law, the doctrine of 
standing operates as a gatekeeper to the courthouse, 
allowing in only those cases that are fit for judicial 
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resolution. . . . Thus, the doctrine of standing limits 
judicial power so that there will not "be a significant 
inroad on the representative form of government, 
cast[ing] the courts in the role of supervising the 
coordinate branches of government . . . [and 
converting] the judiciary into an open forum for the 
resolution of political and ideological disputes about 
the performance of government." . . . For this reason, 
this Court will not lightly dispense with the 
requirement that a litigant have a personal stake in 
the outcome of a specific dispute. . . . Nevertheless, 
it is difficult to make useful, all-inclusive 
generalizations that determine whether standing exists 
in any given case, since the issue often depends on the 
facts of each case. (citations omitted) 
Once the facts have been fully presented by the plaintiff, a 
three-step examination is used to determine an individual 
plaintiff's standing to sue. The first step is concerned with 
the traditional standing criteria of the plaintiff's personal 
stake in the controversy. The plaintiff must have suffered "some 
distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in 
the outcome of the legal dispute." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P. 2d 
1145, 1148 (Utah 1983); accord, Society of Professional 
Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987); Terracor 
v. Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986). 
One who is adversely affected by governmental actions 
has standing under [the traditional criterion of the 
plaintiff's personal stake in the controversy]. One 
who is not adversely affected has no standing. . . . 
There must also be some causal relationship alleged 
between the injury to the plaintiff, the governmental 
actions and the relief requested . . .. If the 
plaintiff satisfies this requirement, he will be 
granted standing and no further inquiry is required, 
(citation omitted, emphasis added) 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d, at 1150. 
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If a plaintiff cannot satisfy the first step, standing may 
nonetheless be granted if no one else has a greater interest in 
the outcome of the dispute and the issue is not likely to be 
raised at all unless the plaintiff is granted standing. Jenkins 
v. Swany 675 P.2d at 1150; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985). 
The third possibility for granting standing is available 
when, in unique cases, the issues are of such great public 
importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the 
public interest. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150. Jenkins v. 
State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1978). 
Under Utah law, an association such as F.O.P. may be granted 
standing to represent its members when "(i) the individual 
members of the association have standing to sue; and (ii) the 
nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the 
individual participation of each injured party indispensable to 
proper resolution of the cause. ..." Utah Restaurant Association 
v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985) 
(quoting Worth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2211, 
45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)); See also, Society of Professional 
Journalists, 743 P.2d at 1175. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING 
F.O.P. DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO 
BRING THIS ACTION. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Plaintiffs' attack on the trial court's conclusion that 
F.O.P. lacked standing is, in initial part and of necessity, 
directed at the erroneous and incomplete findings of fact that 
underlie and give pseudosupport to the dismissal of F.O.P.fs 
claims. The factual analysis of the standing issue should extend 
beyond the nominal facts necessary under notice pleading to any 
additional relevant facts offered by the plaintiff. 
.[I]t is within the Court's power to allow or 
require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the 
complaint or by affidavits, further particularized 
allegations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's 
standing. 
Worth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S. 490, 491, 45 L.Ed.2d, 343, 95 S.Ct. 
2197 (1975) . The findings relative to the initial examination of 
F.O.P.'s standing that plaintiffs contend are not supported by 
substantial evidence and are unequivocally contradicted by the 
facts presented by plaintiffs are, using the numbers assigned by 
the trial court: 
2. One year of service with the West Valley City 
Police Department was required in order to be eligible 
for promotion to Sergeant [R. 432]. 
3. The requirements for promotion to Sergeant required 
that applicants hold the rank of Police Officer within 
the West Valley City Police Department [R. 432]. 
4. Within the rank of Police Officer, all grades 
(P.O.I, P.O.II and P.O.Ill) were eligible for promotion 
to Sergeant with no preference being given to the 
members of any one grade [R. 432]. 
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10. Members of the FOP did not suffer distinct, 
particularized and palpable injury related to the 
conduct of Defendants [R. 433]. 
11. Plaintiff FOP did not present its claims to the 
Civil Service Commission prior to the commencement of 
this lawsuit [R. 433]. 
The trial court apparently relied solely upon the 
affidavits filed by defendants [R. 175-190] in conjunction with 
their Motion to Dismiss on February 20, 1991. It is equally 
apparent that the trial court completely disregarded the 
affidavits supplied by plaintiffs [R. 229-232, 330-369], despite 
their being specifically incorporated into plaintiffs1 Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for Joinder [R. at 
341] and Plaintiffs1 Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [R. at 345]. 
Finding of fact number 2 is supported, by inference, only by 
the requirement that candidates "must be off probation" [R. 6]. 
There is no evidence in the record indicating that the 
probationary period was one year. Moreover, it does not 
establish that seniority was properly considered in the process. 
All six of defendants' affidavits fail to meet the 
requirements of U.R.C.P., 56(e), which states, in pertinent part: 
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissable in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. . . ." 
(emphasis added) 
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The June 6, 1989 Memorandum issued by Nordfelt stated candidates 
must have four years of police service [R. 6]. The October 4, 
1989 letter signed by Commissioners Guy Kimball and Don Meyers 
confirmed that fact [R. 13] . There is no evidence directly 
indicating one year of service with the Department was required, 
and Finding number 2 is therefore clearly erroneous. Crowley, 
Salmon and Shopay, all of whom are F.O.P. members, have alleged 
their seniority was not considered [R. 114-118, 331, 334, 338], 
and a requirement that all candidates have one year of service 
with the Department is not adequate consideration of seniority. 
Furthermore, if officers with only one year of service were 
allowed to participate in the promotion exam, that fact would 
support plaintiffs' claims that F.O.P. members and Crowley were 
made to compete against ineligible candidates. 
Finding of fact number 3 is similarly misleading and lacking 
in support. It was only after the next lower rank requirement 
was waived by Nordfelt and Guy Kimball that P.O. I officers were 
allowed to participate [R. 110, 117, 293-295]. Both state and 
local law, however, provided that only officers of the next lower 
rank, P.O. II, be allowed to compete for the promotion [R. 
117-118, 293-295] [R. 110, 117-118, 293-295; and see, Utah Code 
Ann., §10-3-1010 (1983) and Rule III-l, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988)]. 
Finding number 3 only reflects the state of events after the 
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illegal waiver was obtained. Candidates were required by law to 
hold the P.O. II rank. 
The trial court's fourth finding is also erroneous for the 
reason that, even if read with the other findings, it omits 
mention of the change in eligibility that occurred and the time 
it occurred. Like finding number 3, it is supported only by 
examination of the time after the next lower rank requirement was 
improperly waived [R. 110, 117, 293-295]. Finding number 4 is 
contradicted by, and the trial court's findings omit, the 
overwhelming evidence that only P.O. II officers were eligible 
for promotion to sergeant [R. 110, 117, 293-195]. This error in 
the court's findings foreclosed the possibility of concluding 
that plaintiffs were injured when P.O. II officers competed 
against a field enlarged because P.O. I officers were allowed to 
participate. Finding number 4, however, to the extent it implies 
no preference was given based on seniority, is correct, as 
discussed above in regard to finding number 2. 
Finding number 10 states conclusions that can only be 
reached by turning a blind eye to plaintiffs' pleadings and 
affidavits, and it is supported by defendants' denials, not by 
substantial evidence. Collecting the evidence that supports the 
conclusions is largely a search for negative proof. There is 
some evidence that some F.O.P. members benefitted as a result of 
the inform design and administration of the promotion 
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examination process. Larry Moody and Stephen Shreve only 
administered the promotion examination [R. 178, 189]. Charles 
Ilisley was promoted to sergeant on September 2, 1989, Guy Dodge 
was also promoted to sergeant, and Craig Gibson was scheduled to 
be promoted to sergeant on July 1, 1991 [R. 114, 181, 183, 186]. 
Finding number 10 nevertheless ignores and is contradicted by the 
allegations contained in plaintiffs' pleadings and affidavits. 
All of the candidates, including Crowley, Shopay and Salmon, who 
participated in the process were F.O.P. members [R. 331, 334, 
337-338] . Plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to include 
seniority as a criterion to be considered in the promotion 
process, thus violating Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1010 (1983) and 
Rule III-l, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988) [R. 6-9, 113-118]. Crowley, 
Salmon and Shopay were not given consideration for their 
seniority and alleged the results they received on the promotion 
examination were negatively affected as a result [R. 331-332, 
334-335, 337-338]. Plaintiffs also alleged that P.O. I officers 
were impermissably allowed to participate [R. 110, 117-118, 
331-332, 334-335, 338]. Thus, all P.O. II officers, including 
F.O.P. members Crowley, Salmon and Shopay competed against 
ineligible candidates [R. 118, 186, 331-332, 334-335, 338]. 
Crowley alleged that he would have objected to the Department's 
request to waive the P.O. II requirement, had it not been made 
privately and without his knowledge [R. 338] . 
-25-
Shopay and Salmon alleged they would have earned higher positions 
on the promotion roster if they had not been forced to compete 
with P.O. I officers [R. 331-332, 334]. Plaintiffs further 
alleged that they were not afforded the protection of state law 
and Commission rules and regulations due them [R. 117-118, 
331-332, 334-335, 338]. Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged they 
were injured by the actions of an illegally constituted 
Commission when the two members summarily dismissed the officers1 
claims [R. 13, 117] and by Nordfelt when some candidates taking 
the written exam were not allowed equal access to the study 
materials [R. 10-13, 117]. Insofar as the conclusions stated in 
finding number 10 may be considered to be findings of fact, they 
are clearly erroneous. 
Finding number 11 is supported by the affidavit of Cory 
Ervin supplied by defendants [R. 184-186]. Cory Ervin stated: 
5. As custodian of the records and Secretary to the 
Commission, I have no record, nor do I have any 
knowledge, of Commission receiving any request, appeal, 
or other communication from the organization known as 
"West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4" 
regarding the 1989 sergeant's examination, except in 
connection with the above-encaptioned lawsuit. 
6. . . . I have no record, nor do I have any knowledge 
of the Commission sending any information, ruling, or 
other communication regarding the 1989 sergeants' 
examination, except information supplied in connection 
with the above-encaptioned lawsuit. 
[R. 186] . Finding number 11 is erroneous because it ignores 
plaintiffs' allegation that the Commission was notified, by 
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letter dated August 23, 1989, of a variety of objections voiced 
by Department officers who were also F.O.P. members [R. 10-12, 
110, 116, 332, 335, 339]. It also ignores the allegation that 
the Commission's rules and regulations did not provide a process 
by which Department officers could object to or seek review of 
improprieties in the promotion examination process [R. 117, 332, 
335, 339]. The October 4, 1989 letter signed by Commissioners 
Guy Kimball and Don Meyers [R. 13, 116] also contradicts finding 
number 10, as does Crowley's statement that he would have, if he 
had been aware of the waiver that was obtained, objected, on 
behalf of F.O.P. and individually, to the P.O. I officers' 
participation [R. 338] . Clearly plaintiffs made substantial 
efforts to present the claims known to them at that time to the 
Commission. The trial court's finding belies those facts and is 
not supported by substantial evidence. 
B. F.O.P. HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION IN ITS 
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY. 
F.O.P. clearly meets both criteria of the test enunciated in 
Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 
P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985). See also, Society of Professional 
Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987). In 
regard to the first criterion, the individual members' standing, 
all F.O.P. members are police officers or staff employed by the 
Department, subject to Nordfelt's and the Commission's actions, 
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and must comply with the demands of and enjoy the benefits of the 
merit civil service system. Thus, each F.O.P. member is injured 
when, as is alleged in this action, the merit system which 
governs the employment of each member is violated. The specific 
injuries alleged by F.O.P. have been recognized by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d 59, 61, 21 Utah 2d 
242 (1968): 
The reasons for the adoption of a merit system are to 
protect employees and the public from the evils of the 
spoils system and to assure to each officer an orderly 
opportunity for promotion. The good officer thus has 
an incentive to remain in the service. When promotions 
cease to be made according to the rules adopted, then 
there is a tendancy to engender a demoralizing 
influence in the ranks of men who, having cut 
themselves off from all other occupations, must find 
their comfort in the hopes they have of anticipated 
promotions made according to the rules of the 
commission. 
It is axiomatic that each F.O.P. member is sufficiently "injured" 
for standing purposes, when he or she has lost the protection of 
the merit system that should govern his or her chosen employment, 
is demoralized by that loss and can no longer rely on the 
protection of state law in order to be informed about the 
Commission's actions that affect his or her employment. 
Considering the facts alleged by plaintiffs, the trial court's 
ruling suggests that F.O.P. members, who are merit employees, do 
not have an interest in and cannot be injured by acts of the 
Nordfelt and the Commission that directly and adversely affect 
their present and future employment and their possibility of 
promotion. 
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All of the participants in the promotion examination process 
were F.O.P. members. Although not all F.O.P. members actively 
vied for a position on the promotion roster , it is not strictly 
necessary that all individual F.O.P. members be possessed of 
standing. Utah Restaurant Association, 709 P.2d at 1160, 1163 
("some of" or "a substantial number" of the association's 
individual members were subject to the permit fee complained of). 
Thusf all F.O.P. members may be said to have suffered an injury, 
individually, and the members who actually participated in the 
evaluation process have a greater and more direct injury because 
their seniority was not considered, they were forced to compete 
against improperly authorized P.O. I candidates, the Commission 
was not legally constituted when the two Commissioners summarily 
dismissed their complaints and some candidates were not allowed 
equal access to the study materials. The F.O.P. members who took 
the written exam and, being among the final fifteen candidates, 
participated in the remainder of the promotional examination 
include Shopay and Salmon. Their common injuries, closely 
2 
related to one of the purposes for F.O.P's existence, are more 
than sufficient to give F.O.P. standing in its representative 
capacity. 
Utah has not adopted, as have some courts, the additional 
requirement that the interests the association seeks to protect 
be relevant to the association's purpose. Society of 
Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1175 at n. 10 
(Utah 1987) . 
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The relief sought in this action will remedy the injuries 
suffered by individual F.O.P. members. The initial criterion of 
the Utah Restaurant Association test was met because each 
individual member had standing to sue for relief from a distinct, 
palpable injury to his or her present and future employment that 
adversely affected and will affect the individual. 
F.O.P. also meets the second Utah Restaurant Association 
criterion, which focuses on whether the individual participation 
of each injured party is made indispensable by the nature of the 
claim and of the relief sought. Neither the claim nor the relief 
sought will require the participation as parties, as opposed to 
fact witnesses, of any F.O.P. members. See, Society of 
Professional Journalists, 743 P.2d at 1175 (Utah 1987). This 
action can be litigated solely by plaintiff F.O.P., and the fact 
that individual F.O.P. members may elect to participate as named 
parties is irrelevant to the second criterion. The relief F.O.P. 
seeks will benefit all of its members by remedying the injuries 
described above. Each member will benefit when the promotion 
examination process is declared null and void, the merit civil 
service system is restored, state law is adhered to, the 
candidates1 seniority is considered, only officers of the next 
lower rank are allowed to participate and candidates are allowed 
equal access to the study materials. Any advantage improperly 
conferred upon those also were illegally promoted or placed on 
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the sergeant promotion roster will not nullify, for those so 
situated, the benefit of having the Nordfelt's and Commission's 
wrongs addressed* 
Notably, the relief sought in this case does not include a 
request for monetary damages and, if granted, will benefit F.O.P. 
members as if they had each sued individually. See e.g. , Utah 
Restaurant Association, 709 P. 2d at 1163 (association held to 
have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief but not 
monetary damages on behalf of its members). 
The bulk of the conflicts of interest shadow thrown by 
defendants and observed by the trial court is formed out of the 
incorrect notion that the status of the three F.O.P. members who 
gained unfair advantage from the improper and illegal design and 
administration of the promotion examination process somehow 
deprives F.O.P. of the standing it otherwise has. Correct 
analysis of the question sheds a different light. The suit by 
F.O.P. would have the same effect on the three "advantaged" 
officers named by defendants as would a suit brought by any other 
F.O.P. member individually. R.I. Chapter, Association of General 
Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F.Supp. 338, 346-47 at n.10 (D.Ct. R.I. 
1978) . In R.I. Chapter, the plaintiff brought an action seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief challenging a minority business 
requirement of the Public Works Employment Act and the defendant 
raised the issue of plaintiff's standing, alleging a conflict 
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between the association and its minority members. The court held 
the plaintiff had standing to initiate the action as an 
association on behalf of its members even though some were 
minorities, reasoning that conflict among contract members 
competing over a particular project did not disallow the 
association's standing to assert rights of its injured member. 
In this case, no additional consequences can be realized just 
because F.O.P. brings the action. R.I. Chapter makes it clear 
that an association need not adequately represent the interests 
of any association members who receive advantage or benefit by 
the illegal or improper acts complained of and that absence of 
injury to some members or discrepancies between the injuries 
suffered by an association's members are not fatal to the 
association's standing. 
Furthermore, the three "advantaged" F.O.P. members, under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24, would be free to intervene in 
the action to represent their own interests. Any discrepancy or 
incongruity between interests of individual F.O.P. members does 
not affect F.O.P.'s standing. 
Alternatively, F.O.P. should be granted standing under 
either the second or third steps of the Jenkins v. Swan analysis. 
Defendants abandoned any reliace, by direct argument or 
inference, on the idea that proposed co-plaintiffs Shopay and 
Salmon are not real parties in interest under Rule 17(a) 
[R. 320-322]. 
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As a practical matter, because of the cost of the litigation, no 
single injured police officer has an interest in the outcome of 
the case greater than the cumulative interest of F.O.P. The 
issues are therefore unlikely to be raised at all, much less 
pursued to conclusion, if the dismissal of this action is upheld, 
and for that reason F.O.P.fs standing should be recognized. 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983); Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454-55 (Utah 
1985). Plaintiffs also submit that the issues raised in this 
case, involving violations of seniority consideration and next 
lower rank requirements established by the Department's merit 
civil service system and state law, in conjunction with the other 
improprieties alleged, are sufficiently unique and important to 
the public that standing should be recognized under the third 
step of the Jenkins v. Swan standing analysis. Plaintiffs 
alleged and sufficiently demonstrated F.O.P.fs standing in this 
case. The trial court's ruling is incorrect and should be 
dismissed. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE APPELLATE 
STANDING TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER F.O.P. 
HAD STANDING. 
In the trial court, defendants asserted that plaintiffs' 
action was an attempt to obtain an extraordinary writ governed by 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B (1988) and Utah Supreme Court 
Rule 19 (1987) . This assertion may have been fostered by 
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plaintiffs1 allegation that "Plaintiffs have no other adequate or 
speedy remedy at law to provide the relief requested herein [R. 
117 at para. 15] . Relying upon the general rule that under the 
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, "... persons 
aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies may not, by 
refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, 
by-pass them, and call upon the courts to determine . . . matters 
properly determinable originally by such agencies," S&G, Inc. , 
v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted), 
defendant urged the trial court [R. 166-167, 225] to apply the 
appellate standing test: 
...[W]e conclude that to demonstrate appellate 
standing, one using a petition for a writ as a vehicle 
to obtain appellate-type review of a trial court's 
ruling must show the following: (i) the petitioner had 
standing to proceed before the district court, (ii) the 
petitioner is challenging the district court's ruling 
adverse to him or her, and (iii) the petitioner 
appeared and presented his or her claims to that court. 
If the petitioner fails to establish any one of the 
standing requirements, this Court will not consider the 
claims. 
Society of Journalists, 743 P.2d at 1172. 
The trial court erroneously found [R. 433 at para. 11] and 
incorrectly concluded that F.O.P. "... failed, both on the face 
of the complaint and on the facts of the case, to meet its burden 
to establish that the F.O.P. presented its claims to the Civil 
Service Commission, and therefore does not have standing in this 
case [R. 435 at para. 9]. 
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Plaintiffs1 action, however, is not one brought in the 
nature of an extraordinary writ seeking temporary relief. 
Plaintiffs filed a direct action. Utah Code Ann., §78-3-4(1) 
(1988), provides, "The district court has original jurisdiction 
in all matters civil and criminal not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann., 
§52-4-9 (2) (1977), provides: "A person denied any right under 
this chapter may commence suit in a court of competent 
jurisdiction to compel compliance with or enjoin violations of 
this chapter... ." The trial court ruled incorrectly when it, in 
effect, added an extra hurdle to the factual and legal course 
F.O.P. ran to establish its standing. 
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs must satisfy the Society 
of Journalists appellate standing test, they plainly have done 
so. In Point I.B., supra, and Point II.B., ante, plaintiffs 
demonstrate that both F.O.P. and Crowley met their respective 
standing requirements. Defendants1 argument that F.O.P. did not 
address its grievances to the Commission admits that the 
Commission would have been the proper venue for initial 
presentation of the claims. The fact that no formal mechanism 
existed to present such claims to the Commission is demonstrated 
by the statements of Crowley, Shopay and Salmon indicating the 
Commission's rules and regulations did not provide guidance 
regarding the process by which Departmental officers could object 
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to or seek review of improprieties in the promotion examination 
process [R. 117, 332, 335, 339]. Even though no procedures were 
in place to assist the presentation of the officers' claims, the 
Commission, had it been performing its duties properly, was the 
body before which the officers had standing. There is also no 
question that the officers received an adverse determination from 
the Commission. The October 4, 1989 letter signed by Guy Kimball 
and Don Meyers summarily dismissed their claims [R. 113, 116]. 
There can also be no doubt that the officers appeared, to the 
extent they were allowed, and presented their claims to the 
Commission in the August 23, 1989 letter [R. 10-12, 116, 332, 
335, 339], as established at pp. 21-32, supra. The trial court's 
ruling that F.O.P. lacked standing is manifestly incorrect and 
should be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING 
CROWLEY DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO 
BRING THIS ACTION. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT CONCERNING CROWLEY 
ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
In addition to the Crowley-related findings discussed by 
plaintiffs in Point II.A., the findings concerning plaintiff 
Crowley that plaintiffs contend are not supported by substantial 
evidence and are unequivocally contradicted by the facts 
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presented by plaintiffs' case are, using the number assigned by 
the trial court: 
7. Plaintiff Jim Crowley did not receive the minimum 
required passing score on the written examination and, 
therefore, did not proceed further in the promotional 
process [R. 432] . 
8. Plaintiff Jim Crowley did not suffer a distinct, 
particularized and palpabable injury related to the 
conduct of Defendants [R. 432]. 
Finding number 7 is supported by the Cory Ervin affidavit 
supplied by defendants that asserts "... Crowley did not receive 
a score of 75 or above..." [R. 185 at para. 4.d.] and describes 
Crowley's score as a "... below passing score..." [R. 185 at 
para. 4.e.]. From this evidence the trial court apparently made 
the conclusory finding that Crowley did not achieve the "minimum 
required passing score." But no "minimum" score was required. 
The memoranda issued by Nordfelt and the West Valley Personnel 
Office stated those candidates who received the top fifteen 
scores on the written exam would advance to the "assessment 
center" [R. 6-7, 8-9, 107-108, 114]. Finding 7 is clearly 
erroneous. The promotion examination announcements are better 
evidence of the procedure used than Cory Ervin1s characterization 
of what any Commission records may indicate. The actual record 
Cory Ervin relies on is neither identified in nor supplied with 
his affidavit. 
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Finding number 8 states conclusions that find their support 
in the trial court's erroneous finding number 7, the fact Crowley 
did not obtain one of the top fifteen scores on the written exam 
and the fact he was not allowed to advance to the "assessment 
center" [R. 7, 8-9, 185, 338]. The trial court's misperception 
that a minimum passing score existed is the primary reason 
finding number 8 is erroneous. Crowley missed, by a single 
point, achieving one of the top fifteen scores on the written 
exam [R. 185, 338]. Crowley alleged two primary injuries 
suffered by him. First, he was improperly required to compete 
against additional candidates holding only the P.O. I rank [R. 
113-118, 338]. It is without question that at least one of those 
P.O. I officers, Guy Dodge, scored higher than Crowley on the 
written exam [R. 118, 186], thus bumping him from the list of the 
top fifteen candidates. As a result, he was precluded from 
obtaining a position on the final sergeant promotion roster that 
was established after the "assessment center" and "promotability" 
portions were completed. Clearly, Crowley was injured. Second, 
Crowley alleged that seniority was not considered in the 
promotion process as required by law and that he was unfairly 
deprived of his approximately nine years of seniority [R. 6-9, 
113-118, 339]. Seniority may be considered in myriad ways. 
There is no evidence in the record establishing precisely how 
seniority would have been considered in this promotion 
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examination had it been conducted according to law. Crowley 
states that if seniority had been considered, he would have been 
allowed to advance to the later stages of the promotion process 
4 [R. 338]. Crowley's loss of an opportunity to compete for a 
promotion and his being required to compete with ineligible 
candidates are, despite the trial court's misunderstanding of the 
case, a distinct, particularized and palpable injury directly 
related to defendants' conduct. Crowley also alleged he was 
injured by the Commission being illegally constituted on October 
4, 1989 and by candidates not being allowed equal access to study 
materials [R. 10-13, 117]. 
The trial court's findings numbers 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 10 are 
clearly erroneous and cannot support the incorrect ruling that 
Crowley lacked standing. 
B. CROWLEY HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION. 
It is clear that Crowley alleged and demonstrated for the 
trial court, as shown in sections II.A. and III.A. hereof, that 
he suffered adverse effects caused by Nordfelt's and the 
As a single illustrative example, even with the 
participation of the unqualified P.O. I candidates, it is 
possible that, based upon their seniority, candidates may 
have been given credit towards their ultimate score on the 
written exam. Such a method is logical at least to the 
extent that it would afford candidates credit for their 
seniority before the final fifteen were determined. Under 
such an arrangement Crowley would have needed a credit of 
only one point for his nine years seniority to make the 
final fifteen. 
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Commission's actions and that the relief requested will remedy 
those adverse effects. Thus, Crowley plainly has a solid factual 
basis for his standing to bring this action. Jenkins v. Swan, 
675 P.2d 1145 (1983); accord, Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County, 702 P.2d 451 (Utah 1985); Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713 
(Utah 1978). 
Even if the trial court's erroneous finding that Crowley did 
not achieve the "minimum passing score" were true, Crowley would 
have standing. Crowley claimed that the entire evaluation 
process was invalid, should be declared null and void and was 
conducted contrary to established law. 
It might be argued that so long as respondents 
failed the test, they would have no cause to 
complain because some unauthorized applicant 
passed it. Such, however, is not the case. If no 
one passed the test, the respondents would have 
another chance to take an examination, and if 
successful in the second examination, they would 
be considered for promotion. If the position was 
already filled by an ineligible man, there is no 
vacancy to which respondents can aspire, and there 
is no reason for giving another examination, 
(emphasis added) 
Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d 59, 60, 21 Utah 2d 242 (1968). 
Regardless of an eligible candidate's performance in any part of 
the evaluation process, as a valid participant, he or she has a 
personal stake in having the process conducted under the civil 
service merit system utilized by the Department and the 
Commission and according to the laws of Utah. Crowley had 
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standing by virtue of his participation as a candidate in the 
promotional process that was alleged to have been improperly and 
illegally designed and administered and of the consequences he 
suffered thereby. See, e.g., Society of Journalists, 743 P.2d at 
1176. Very simply put, Crowley was injured when he was not 
afforded a fair, equitable and legal opportunity for promotion. 
The factual allegations supporting his claims are plainly set 
forth in the pleadings and affidavits on record, and therefore 
the court erred in dismissing his claim for lack of standing. 
Plaintiff requests this Court to overturn that ruling and the 
dismissal of Crowley as a plaintiff in this action that resulted 
therefrom. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
THE MOTION FOR JOINDER. 
Plaintiffs admittedly terse motion for joinder [R. 216-217] 
was initially supported by first affidavits filed by Shopay and 
Salmon [R. 229-232]. Later, Shopay, Salmon and Crowley filed 
their "second" affidavits to offer additional factual support for 
the joinder motion [R. 330-335]. 
Rule 20, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987), provides, in 
pertinent part: 
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs 
if they assert any right to relief jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative in respect of or 
arising out of the same transaction occurrence, or 
series of transactions or occurrences and if any 
question of law or fact common to all of them will 
arise in the action. ... 
-41-
The trial court denied the motion for joinder after 
determining "... that Plaintiff F.O.P. and Plaintiff Crowley did 
not have standing and the subsequent dismissal of their complaint 
renders William Salmon and David Shopayfs Motion for Joinder moot 
[R. 435 at para. 12, 436] . Plaintiffs submit that because, as 
demonstrated in the preceeding sections of this brief, both 
F.O.P. and Crowley manifestly had standing to bring this action, 
the motion for joinder was not moot. Provided either F.O.P. or 
Crowley had standing, the motion for joinder was not moot and 
should have been granted based upon the Second Amended Complaint 
and from affidavits submitted by Shopay, Salmon and Crowley. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs/appellants request 
that the trial court's rulings with respect to F.O.P.'s and 
Crowley's standing be reversed, that the dismissal based on lack 
of standing and therefore subject matter jurisdiction be reversed 
and that the case be remanded back to the District Court for 
trial. In addition, plaintiff/appellants request that the trial 
court's denial of the motion for joinder based on mootness be 
reversed and the motion for joinder be remanded back to the 
District Court with direction to allow proposed co-plaintiffs 
Shopay and Salmon to join in the action. 
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Rule 20. Permissive joinder of part ies. 
(a) Permissive joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if 
they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in re-
spect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transac-
tions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them 
will arise in the action. Ail persons may be joined in one action as defendants 
if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any 
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, 
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact 
common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need 
not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. 
Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their 
respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according to 
their respective liabilities. 
(b) Separate trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a 
party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a 
party against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against 
him, and may order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or 
nreiudice. 
JIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65B 
(4) in all other cases where an injunction 
would be proper in equity. 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary writs. 
(a) Special forms of writs abolished. Special 
forms of pleadings and of write in habeas corpus, 
mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and 
other extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are 
hereby abolished. Where no other plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained by 
appropriate action under these rules, on any one of 
the grounds set forth in Subdivisions (b) and (t) of this 
rule. 
(b) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be 
granted: 
(1) where any person usurps, intrudes into, or 
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, civil 
or military, or a franchise, or an office in a corpo-
ration created by the authority of this state; or 
any public officer, civil or military, does or per-
mits to be done any act which by the provisions of 
law works a forfeiture of his office; or an associa-
tion of persons act as a corporation within this 
state without being legally incorporated; or any 
corporation has offended against any piovision of 
the law, as it may have been amended, by or 
under which law such corporation was created, 
altered or renewed; or any corporation has for-
feited its privileges and franchises by nonuser or 
has committed an act amounting to a surrender 
or a forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges 
and franchises or has misused a franchise or 
privilege conferred upon it by law, or exercised a 
franchise or privilege not so conferred; or 
(2) where an inferior tribunal, beard or officer 
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its ju-
risdiction or abused its discretion* or 
(3) where the relief sought is to compel any 
inferior tribunal, or any corporation, board or 
person to perform an act which the law specially 
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or 
station; or to compel the admission of a party to 
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to 
which he is entitled and from which he is unlaw-
fully excluded by such inferior tribunal or by 
such corporation, board or person; or 
(4) where £he relief sought is to arrest the pro-
ceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or 
person, whether exercising functions judicial or 
ministerial, when such proceedings are without 
or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, 
corporation, board or person. 
(c) Action by attorney general under Subdivi-
sion (b)(1) of this rule. The attorney general may, 
and when directed so to do by the governor shall, 
commence any action authorized by the provisions of 
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule. Such action shall be 
brought in the name of the state of Utah. 
(d) Action by private person under Subdivi-
sion CbXl) of this rule. A person claiming to be enti-
tled to a public or private office unlawfully held and 
exercised by another may bring an acticn therefor. A 
private person may bring an action upon any other 
ground set forth in Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule, only 
if the attorney general fails to do so after notice. Any 
such action commenced by a private person shall be 
brought in his own name. Upon filing the complaint, 
such person shall also file an undertaking with suffi-
cient sureties, in the same form required of bonds on 
appeal under the provision of Rule 73 and conditioned 
that such person will pay any judgment for costs or 
damages recovered, against him in such action. 
Rule 65B UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 5i6, 
(e) Nature and extent of relief under Subdivi-
sion (b)(2) of this rule. Upon the filing of a com-
plaint seeking relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this 
rule, the court may require notice to be given to the 
adverse pcrty before issuance of the writ, or may 
grant an order to show cause why such writ should 
not be issued, or may grant the writ without notice. If 
the writ is granted, it shall be directed to the inferior 
tribunal, board, or officer, or to any other person hav-
ing the custody of the iccord or proceedings, com-
manding such tribunal, board or officer to certify 
fully to the court issuing the writ, within a specified 
time, a transcript of the record and proceedings, de-
scribing or referring to them with sufficient cer-
tainty; and if a stay of proceedings is intended, re-
quiring the party in the meantime to desist from fur-
ther proceedings in the matter to be reviewed. The 
review by the court issuing the writ shall not be ex-
tended further than to determine whether the infe-
rior tribunal board or officer has regularly pursued 
the authority of such tribunal, board or officer. 
(f) Habeas corpus. Appropriate relief by habeas 
corpus proceedings shall oe granted whenever it ap-
pears to the proper court that any person is unjustly 
imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his hberty. If 
the person seeking relief is imprisoned in the peni-
tentiary and asserts that in the proceedings which 
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial de-
nial of his rights under the Constitution of the United 
States or under the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
or both, then the person seeking such relief shall pro-
ceed in accordance with Rule 65B(i). In all other 
cases, proceedings under this subdivision shall )oe 
conducted in accordance with the following provi-
sions: 
(1) The complaint seeking relief shall, among 
other things, .state that the person designated is 
illegally restrained of his liberty by the defen-
dant and the place where he is so restrained, if 
known (stating wherein and the cause or pre-
tense thereof, according to the best information 
of the plaintiff, annexing a copy of any legal pro-
cess or gi\ing a satisfactory explanation for fail-
ing so to do); that the legality of the imprison-
ment or restraint has not already been adjudged 
upon a prior proceeding; whether another com-
plaint for the same relief has been filed and relief 
thereunder denied by any court, and if so attach-
ing a copy of such complaint and stating the rea-
sons for the denial of relief or giving satisfactory 
reasons for the failure to do so. 
(2) The complaint shall be filed in the court 
most convenient to the plaintiff. 
(3) Upon the filing of the complaint the court 
shall, unless it appears from such complaint or 
the showing of the plaintiff that he is not entitled 
to any relief, issue a writ directed to the defen-
dant commanding him to bring the person al-
leged to be restrained before the court at a time 
and place therein specified, at which time the 
court shall proceed in a summary manner to hear 
the matter and render judgment accordingly. If 
the writ is not issued the court shall state its 
reasons therefor in writing and file the same 
with the complaint, and shall deliver a copy 
thereof to the plaintiff. 
(4) If the defendant cannot be found, or if he 
does not have such person in custody, the writ 
(and any other process issued) may be served 
upon any one having such person in custody, in 
the manner and with the same effect as if he had 
been made defendant in the action. 
(5) If the defendant conceals himself, or re-d 
fuses admittance to the person attempting tor 
serve the writ, or if he attempts wrongfully tol 
carry the person imprisoned or restrained cut of 
the county or state after service of the writ, the* 
person serving the writ shall immediately arrest! 
the defendant, or other person so resisting, and 
bring him, together with the person designated 
in the writ, forthwith before the court before 
which the writ is made returnable. 
(6) At the time of the issuance of the writ, the 
court, may, if it appears that the person desig-i 
nated will be carried out of the jurisdiction of the1 
court or will suffer some irreparable injury before 
compliance with the writ can be enforced, cause a 
warrant to issue, reciting the facts, and directing 
the sheriff to take such person and forthwith 
bring him before the court to be dealt with ac-. 
cording to law. 
(7) The defendant shall appear at the proper 
time and place with the person designated or. 
show good cause for not doing so and must an-
swer the complaint within the time allowed. The 
answer must state plainly and unequivocally 
whether he then has, or at any time has hsd, the 
person designated under his control and re-
straint, and if so, the cause thereof. If such per-, 
son has been transferred, the defendant must 
state that fact, and to whom, when the transfer 
was made, and the reason or authority therefor. 
The writ shall not be disobeyed for any defect of 
form or misdescription of the person restrained or 
defendant, if enough is stated to show the mean-
ing and intent thereof. 
(8) The person restrained may waive his right 
to be present at the hearing, in which case the 
writ shall be modified accordingly. Pending a de-
termination of the matter the court may place 
such person in the custody of such individual or 
individuals as may be deemed proper. 
(g) When counsel appointed for petitioner. Any 
person filing a petition for habeas corpus may be ap-
pointed counsel whenever the district court, upon ex-
amination of the petition, determines that the peti-
tion is not frivolous and that such person is finan-
cially unable to obtain representation. If the petition 
for habeas corpus is frivolous, the district court shall, 
without further action, dismiss the petition. 
(h) When writ returnable. Any alternative writ 
issued by a court or a judge thereof, may be made 
returnable, and a hearing thereon may be had, at any 
time as such court may in its discretion determine. 
(i) Postconviction hearings. 
(1) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary 
or county jail under a commitment of any court, 
whether such imprisonment be under an original 
commitment or under a commitment for viola-
tion of probation or parole, whu asserts that in 
any proceedings which resulted in his commit-
ment there v/as a substantial denial of his rights 
under the Constitution of the United States or of 
the state of Utah, or both, may institute a pro-
ceeding under this rule. 
Such proceedings shall be commenced by filing 
a complaint, together with a copy thereof with 
the clerk of the court in which such relief is 
sought. The complainant shall also serve a copy 
of the complaint so filed upon the attorney gen-
eral of the state of Utah if imprisoned in trie state 
prison, or the county attorney of the cnunty 
where imprisoned if in a county jail. Such service 
may be made by any of the methods provided for 
service in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, er by mailing such copy to the attorney 
general or county attorney by United States 
mail, postage prepaid, and by filing with the 
clerk of said court a certificate of mailing certify-
ing under oath that a copy was so mailed to the 
attorney general or county attorney. Upo;i the 
filing of such a complaint, the clerk shall 
promptly bring the same to the attention of the 
presiding judge of the court in which such com-
plaint is filed. 
(2) The complaint shall state that the person 
seeking relief's illegally restrained of his liberty 
by the dafendant; shall state the place where he 
is so restrained; shall state the dates of and iden-
tify the proceedings in which the complainant 
was convicted and by which he was subsequently 
confined and of which he now complains; and 
shall set forth in plain and concise terms the fac-
tual data constituting each and every manner in 
which the complainant claims that any constitu-
tional rights were violated. The complaint shall 
have attached thereto affidavits, copies of 
records, or other evidence supporting such alle-
gations, or shall state why the same are not at-
tached. 
The complaint shall also state whether or not 
the judgment of conviction that resulted in the 
confinement complained of has been reviewed on 
appeal, and if so, shall identify such appellate 
proceedings and state the results thereof. 
The complaint shall further state that the le-
gality or constitutionality of his commitment or 
confinement has not already been adjudged in a 
prior habeas corpus or other similar proceeding; 
and if the complainant shall have instituted prior 
similar proceedings in any court, state or federal, 
within the state of Utah, he shall so state in his 
complaint, shall attach a copy of any pleading 
filed in such court by him to his complaint, and 
shall set forth the reasons for the denial of relief 
in such other court. In such case, if it is apparent 
to the court in which the proceeding under this 
rule is instituted that the legality or constitu-
tionality of his confinement has already been ad-
judged in such prior proceedings, the court shall 
forthwith dismiss such complaint, giving written 
notice thereof by mail to the complainant, and no 
further proceedings shall be had on such com-
plaint. 
(3) Argument, citations and discussion of au-
thorities shall not be set forth in the complaint, 
but may be set out in a separate supporting mem-
orandum or brief if the complainant so desires. 
(4) All claims of the denial of any of complain-
ant's constitutionaJ rights shall be raised in the 
postconviction proceeding brought under this 
rule and may not be raised in another subse-
quent proceeding except for good cause shown 
therein. 
(5) [Deleted.] 
(6) Within ten days after service of a copy of 
the complaint upon him, the attorney general, or 
the county attorney, as the case may be, shall 
answer the complaint or otherwise plead thereto. 
Any further pleadings or amendments shall be in 
conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
(7) When an answer is filed, the court shall 
immediately set the case for a hearing within 
twenty days thereafter unless the coui*t in its dis-
cretion determines that further time is needed. 
Prior to the bearing, the state or county shsa 
obtain such transcript of proceedings or court 
records as may be relevant and material to the 
case. The court, on its own motion, or upon the 
request of eithor party, may order a prehearing 
conference if good reason exists therefor; but 
such conference shall not he set so as to unrea-
sonably delay the hearing on the mtrit3 of the 
complaint. The complainant shall be brought be 
fore the court for any hearing or conference. 
If the court in which the complaint is filed de-
termines that in the interest of convenience and 
economy, the hearing should be transferred to 
the district court having jurisdiction over the 
place of confinement of complainant, the court 
may enter a written order transferring such case 
and shall set forth in such order its reasons for so 
doing. 
(8) In each case, the court, upon determining 
the case, shall enter specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and judgment, in writing, and 
the same shall be made a part of the record in the 
case. 
If the court finds in favor of the complainant, it 
shall enter an appropriate order with respect to 
the judgment or sentence in the former proceed-
ings and such further orders with respect to 
rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail or discharge 
as the court may deem just and proper in the 
case. 
(9) If the complainant is unable to pay the 
costs of the proceedings, he may proceed in forma 
pauperis upon the filing of an affidavit to that 
effect, in which event the court may direct the 
costs to be paid by the county in which he was 
originally charged. 
(10) Any final judgment entered upon such 
complaint may be appealed to and reviewed by 
the Supreme Court of Ucah as an appeal in civil 
cases. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1985; Marclj 1. 1988.) 
Rule 66. Receivers. 
(a) Grounds for appointment. A receiver may be 
appointed by the court in which an action is pending 
or rias passed to judgment: 
(1) In an action by a vendor to vacate a fraudu-
lent purchase of property, or by p. creditor to sub-
ject any property or fund to his claim, or between 
partners or ethers jointly owning or interested in 
any property or fund, on the application of the 
plaintiff, or of any party whose right to or inter-
est in the property or fund, or the proceeds 
thereof,,is probable, and where it is shown that 
the property or fund is in danger of being lost, 
removed or materially injured. 
(2) In an action by a mortgagee for the foreclo-
sure of his mortgage and sale of the mortgaged 
property, where it appears that the mortgaged 
property is in danger of being lost, removed or 
materially injured; or that the conditions of the 
mortgage have not been performed and that the 
property is probably insufficient to discharge the 
mortgage debt. 
(3) After judgment, to carry the judgment into 
effect. 
(4) After judgment, to dispose of the property 
according to th* judgment, or to preserve it dur-
ing the pendency of an appeal, or in proceedings 
in aid of execution when an execution has been 
returned unsatisfied, or when the judgment 
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band, wife, son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle, aunt, 
nephew, niece, first cousins, mother-in-law, father-in-
law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or 
daughter-in-law, is retained in office by any of said 
officials shall be regarded as a separate offense. 1953 
52-3-3. Penalty. 
Any person violating any of the provisions of this 
chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor. 1953 
52-3-4. Exception in rowns. 
In towns, this chapter shall not apply to the em-
ployment of uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces or cousins. 
1953 
CHAPTER 4 
OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS 
Section 
52-4-1. Declaration of public policy. 
52-4-2. Definitions. 
52-4-3. Meetings open to the public — Exceptions. 
52-4-4. Closed meeting held upon vote of members 
— Business — Reasons for meeting re-
corded. 
52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings — Chance 
meetings and social meetings excluded 
— Disruption of meetings. 
52-4-6. Public notice of meetings. 
52-4-7. Minutes of open meetings — Public records 
— Recording of rneetings.( 
52-4-8. Suit to void final action — Limitation — 
Exceptions. 
52-4-9. Enforcement of chapter — Suit to compel 
compliance. 
52-4-1. Declaration of public policy. 
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and 
declares that the state, its agencies and political sub-
divisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the people's 
business. It is the intent of the law iha t their actions 
be taken openly and that their deliberations be con-
ducted openly. 1977 
52-4-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Meeting" means the convening of a public 
body, with a quorum present, whether in person 
or by means of electronic equipment, for the pur-
pose of discussing or acting upon a mat ter over 
which the public body has jurisdiction or advi-
sory power. This chapter shall not apply to 
chance meetings. "Convening," as used in this 
subsection, means the calling of a meeting of a 
public body by a person or persons authorized to 
do so for the express purpose of discussing or act-
ing upon a subject over which that public body 
has jurisdiction. 
(2) "Public body" means any administrative, 
advisory, executive, or legislative body of the 
state or its political subdivisions which consists 
of two or moie persons that expends, disburses, 
or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue 
and which is vested with che authority to make 
decisions regarding the public's business. "Public 
body" does not include any political party, group, 
or caucus nor any conference committee, rules or 
sifting committee of the Legislature. 
(3) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the 
membership of a public body, unless otherwise 
defined by applicable law, but a quorum does not 
include a meeting of two elected officials by 
themselves when no action, either formal or in-
formal, is taken on a subject over which these 
elected officials have jurisdiction. i»€7 
52-4-3. Meetings open to the public — Excep-
tions. 
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed 
pursuant to Sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5. 1977 
52-4-4. Closed meeting held upon vote of mem-
bers — Business — Reasons for meet-
ing recorded. 
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative 
vote of two-thirds of the members of the public body 
present at an open meeting for which notice is given 
pursuant to Section 52-4-6; provided, a quorum it 
present. No closed meeting is allowed except as to 
mat ters exempted under Section 52-4-5; provided, no 
ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or 
appointment shall be approved at a closed meeting. 
The reason or reasons for holding a closed meeting 
and the vote, either for or against the proposition to 
hold such a meeting, cast by each member by name 
shall be entered on the minutes of the meeting. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to re-
quire any meeting to be closed to the public. 1977 
52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings — Chance 
meetings and social meetings excluded 
— Disruption of meetings. 
(1) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to Sec-
tion 52-4-4 for any of the following purposes: 
(a) discussion of the character, professional 
competence, or physical or mental health of an 
individual; 
(b) strategy sessions with respect to collective 
bargaining, litigation, or purchase of real prop-
erly; 
(c) discussion regarding deployment of secu-
rity personnel or devices; and 
(d 1 investigative proceedings regarding allega-
tions of criminal misconduct. 
(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance 
meeting or a social meeting. No chance meeting or 
social meeting shall be used to circumvent this chap-
ter. 
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of 
any person who willfully disrupts a meeting to the 
extent tha t orderly conduct is seriously compromised. 
1977 
52-4-6. Public notice of meetings. 
(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings 
tha t are scheduled in aavance over the course of a 
year shall giv3 public notice at least once each year of 
its annual meeting schedule as provided in this sec-
tion. The public notice shall specify the date, time, 
and place of such meetings. 
(2) Jn addition to the notice requirements of Sub-
section (1) of this section, each public body shall give 
not less than 2^ hours' public notice of the agenda, 
date, t ime and place of each of its meetings. 
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by: 
(a) posting written notice at the principal of-
fice of the public body, or if no such office exists, 
at the building where the meeting is to be held; 
and 
(b^ providing notice to at least one newspaper 
of general circulation within the geographic ju-
risdiction of the public body, or to a local media 
correspondent. 
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is 
necessary for a public body to hold an emergency 
JERRALD D. CONDER (#0709) 
K. C. BENNETT (#3700) 
Of CONDER & WANGSCARD 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER ] 
OF POLICE LODGE #4 non-profit 
Utah Corporation and JIM 
CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS NORDFELT, WEST VALLEY 
CHIEF OF POLICE AND WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION/ 
Defendants. 
CORRECTED 
I AMENDED COMPLAINT 
i Case No. 89-0907667 
1. Plaintiff, West Valley Fraternal Order of Police Lod?e 
#4 is a Utah non-profit corporation comprised of police officers 
and support staff employed by West Valley City. 
2. Plaintiff, Jim Crowley is a West Valley Police Officer 
and member of Lodge #4 West Valley Fraternal Order of Police. 
3. Defendant, Dennis Nordfelt is the West Valley City 
Chief of Police. 
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4. Defendant, West Valley Civil Service Commission is the 
commission appointed pursuant to the provisions of Section 
10-3-1003 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 and charged with the respon-
sibility of administering the Civil Service Laws as they apply to 
West Valley City and its employees. 
5. On or about June 6, 19 89 an announcement for the 
position of sergeant was posted by the West Valley Police Depart-
ment. A copy of said announcement is attached hereto marked 
Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein as though fully set forth. 
6. On or about July 7, 1989 a memorandum was issued by the 
West Valley personnel office setting forth the dates of the 
written test, assessment center and weights to be considered for 
promotability. A copy of said memorandum is attached hereto 
marked Exhibit 2 and incorporated herein as though full}7 set 
forth. 
7. On or about September 2, 1989 appointments were made to 
the position or sergeant pursuant to the procedures and weighting 
set forth in Exhibit 2. 
8. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 10-3-1010 Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 the Civil Service Commission is directs^ d 
among other things to provide for promotion on the basis of 
seniority in service. 
9. The rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commis-
sion together with the procedures adopted to provide for 
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promotion to sergeant failed as required by law, to consider 
seniority in service as a basis for promotion. 
10. Section 10-3-1002 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 states: 
". . . . N o appointments to any of the places of 
employment constituting the classified civil service in 
the departments shall be made except according to law 
and under the rules and regulations of the Civil 
Service Commission. 
11. On or about August 23, 1989 certain members of the West 
Valley Police Department requested the commission to review 
alleged improprieties regarding the promotional examination for 
the position of sergeant. All of the signators to said request 
are members of plaintiff, Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4. A 
copy of said request is attached hereto marked Exhibit 3 and 
incorporated herein as though fully set forth. 
12. On or about October 4, 1939 without conducting a formal 
hearing or convening a meeting to consider the complaints set 
forth in Exhibit 3, two members of the Civil Service Commission 
prepared a letter summarily dismissing the complaints of the 
individual officers. A copy of said letter was delivered to a 
representative of the West Valley Fraternal Order of Police on 
November 2, 1989. A copy of said letter is attached hereto 
marked Exhibit 4 and incorporated herein as though fully S'.-.'c 
forth. 
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13. On or about October 4, 1989 the West Valley Civil 
Service Commission was not legally constituted as required by the 
provision of 10-3-1003 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
14. The conduct of the examination for sergeant examination 
violated the provision of Section 10-3-1007 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 and Rule 11-12 of the West Valley Civil Service Policy and 
Procedures. 
15. Plaintiffs have no other adequate or speedy remedy at 
law to provide the relief requested herein. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
16. The Provision of Section 3-1 of the Civil Service 
Policy and Procedures Manual requires a promotion to be filled 
from the next lower rank. 
17. On or about June 6, 1989, defendant Dennis Hordf^t 
through his agents approached the chairman of the civil service 
commission, Guy Kimball and requested that particular require-
ments be waived. 
18. Said request was in a letter generated in the office of 
Chief Dennis Nordfelt hand delivered to Guy Kimball. 
19. On or about the same day, June 6, 19 89 defendant Guy 
Kimball, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission signed the 
aforementioned letter and marked it "approved". 
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20. This action was taken in violation of the Utah Open ond 
Public Meetings Act and in violation of Rules of the West ValJjy 
Civil Service Policy and Procedures Manual Section 1-6. 
21. This request by Chief of Police and its approval by ;he 
Civil Service Commission was done with the intent to allow Guy 
Dodge, as a person otherwise unqualified, to sit for the exam. 
22. By and through the actions of Chief Nordfelt and the 
Civil Service Commission, Guy Dodge was allowed to sit for the 
exam and did in fact receive the Sergeants Promotion. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand that the Court enter an order 
nullifying the test results and promotion made pursuant thereto 
and directing the West Valley Civil Service Commission to conduct 
a new examination pursuant to their own rules and regulations and 
as required by law with specific orders to consider seniority in 
service as a basis for promotability. 
DATED this /J> day of ^ e . ^ / * ^ , 1991. 
«**' C. BEMETT 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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EXHIBIT 
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K K y West Valley City ^ ^ POLICE DEPARTMENT 
) ^L 
\ 
June 6, 1989 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: All Police Officers Eligible for Promotional 
Examination - Sergeant 
FROM: Chief's Of f i<£lL iyjww***, 
RE: Promotional Examination 
"TT 
This memorandum i s to not i fy o f f ice rs that there wi l l be a 
promotional examination for an immediate Sergeant's position and 
to establ ish a ros ter . Passing grade for a l l tes ts will be set at 
75%. 
Al l q u a l i f i e d and i n t e r e s t e d c a n d i d a t e s need to apply by 
submitting a to/from to Assistant Chief Shreeve indicating their 
i n t e r e s t and ou t l in ing q u a l i f i c a t i o n s no l a t e r than SxftihaBW: 
im&tmte^xZm&iMtKxiamiX NOON, ON MONDAY, JUNE 1 9 , 1 9 8 9 . 
QUALIFICATIONS: 
- Must have four years of police service (plus two additional 
years police experience if substituting for college). 
- Must have two years of college (two years police experience 
can be substituted). 
Must be off probation. 
- Must have above average performance evaluation. 
WRITTEN ,EXAMIHATION: 
AIT qualified candidates W I I L oe givenntwo,
 ftext books to 
study from' 30 days prior to the written examination. This 
examination will "consist of management concepts taken from 
this reference material, and will be the ONLY material 
needed to study for this examination. There will be no 
questions from the criminal code or the policy manual on the 
exam. 
V 2470 South Redwood Road West Valley City Utah 84119 Phone (801) 974-5468 TTtmUW 
Promotional Examination/Sergeant 
June 6, 1989 
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Candidates may pick up their text books from Lt. Moody or 
Assistant Chief Shreeve on June 19th and 20th only. 
The written examination will be given on Thursday, July 20, 
1989. 
ASSESSMENT CENTER: 
Only the top 15 candidates (with a passing score) on the 
written examination will be invited to attend a two-day 
assessment center. The assessment center will be July 25th 
and 26th, 1989. 
Timas and places for both the written examination and assessment 
center will be announced later. 
iH i nn? 
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\SfpSff West Valley City PERSONNEL OFFICE 
July 7, 1989 
MEMORANDUM 
T 0 :
 All Candidates for Promotional Examination - Sergeant 
FROM: Personnel Office C ^ 
RE: Promotional Examination 
This memorandum is to notity officers who have applied to take 
this promotional examination for an immediate Sergeant's position 
of the times and location of the examination. 
WRITTEN TEST: July 20, 1989 - Granger High School 
Cafeteria, 3690 South 3600 West - 9:00 a.m. 
Two and one half hours will be allowed for 
the written test. 
ASSESSMENT CENTER: The top 15 candidates from the written test 
will be eligible to participate in the 
Assessment Center . 
The Assessment Center will be held July 25 
and 26, 1989 - P.O.S.T., 4501 Soutn 2700 West 
- 8:00 a.m. 
»H woct v/aiipv Citv Utah 84119 Phone '801)974-5501 ( > ( ) Q Q 8 
Promotional Examination/Sergeant 
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Paqe 2 
Candidates may pick up their text books from Lt. Moody or 
Assistant Chief Shreeve on June 19th and 20th only. 
The written examination will be given on Thursday, July 20, 
1989. 
ASSESSMENT CENTER: 
Only the too 15 candidates (with a passing score) on the 
written examination will be invited to attend a two-Oay 
assessment center. The assessment center will be July 25th 
and 26th, 1989, 
Times and places for both the written examination and assessioent 
center will be announced later. 
WEIGHTS FOR PROFITABILITY TESTING ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
Assessment 40% 
Promotability 4 0% 
Written 20% 
ouoog 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
August 23, 1989 
Wes;: Valley City 
Civil Service Commission 
Dear Commissioners: 
We the undersigned police officers of West Valley City wish 
to submit this letter outlining our concerns over certain 
improprieties regarding the recent promotional examination for 
the position of sergeant* 
On August 15/ 1989 at a meeting of the membership of West 
Valley Lodge #4 of the Fraternal Order of Police, Chief Nordfelt 
responded to a list of allegations regarding the test. In his 
response Chief Nordfelt verified several of our concerns as fact, 
and as being improper. However, it appears that the police 
administration does not intend to take any action in this matter. 
A copy of our entire list of concerns as presented to Chief 
Nordfelt is attached for consideration. However, we would like 
to address some of the issues we feel are of particular concern; 
one of which did not come to light until after the initial list 
was compiled. 
First, as confirmed by Chief Nordfelt, one of the officers 
who participated in the test was assigned to pick up the shipment 
of books from which the test was derived. This officer surmised 
what the books were for, and noted that he already owned a copy 
of one of them. After obtaining the title of the second book he 
purchased a copy of it also. The titles of these two books were 
denied to all the other participants in the test until exactly 
thirty days before the test was given. 
We would like to note here that several officers scheduled 
to take the test were going to be out of town on the date the 
books were to be given out and were refused access to the books 
even one day earlv. Some of these officers were forced to wait 
dayc, even weeks before gaining access to the study materials; 
thus cutting short their time to prepare for the test. This 
5 Liuation gave one officer an unfair advantage over all other 
oa r4- icipanLs . These circumstances were brought to the attention 
Civil Service Commission 
August 23, 1989 
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of the administration, however, they chose to ignore it and 
allowed the officer to take the test. That officer's ultimate 
position on the promotional list is number two. 
Second, Salt Lake police supervisors were permitted to give 
input as to the promotabi^ty of one officer currently assigned 
to the Metro Narcotics Unit. However/ other officers who have 
been assigned to the unit were not afforded the same opportunity. 
In another promotability related issue the spouse of one of 
the test participants were permitted to evaluate the 
promotability of her spouse's competition. 
Finally an issue that had not come to our attention until 
after the initial list of concerns was compiled. The concern is 
that seniority was not considered in the testing process. This 
is in violation of state statute (10-3-1010 UCA). 
In conclusion the undersigned police officers of West Valley 
City request that the commission look into these allegations. We 
further believe that given the circumstances described herein, 
the exam in question should be considered invalid. 
<»uni i 
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WEST VALLEY O R © CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
2470 South Redwood Road 
West Valley City, Utah 
GOY W. KIHBALLr Chairman 
October 4, 1989 
-•The Civil Service Commission has reviewed the petition received from 
severe-:! police officers, and the response to the petition submitted from the 
Police Administration. While we recognize there were some areas of concern for 
the candidates participating in the sergeant test and assessment center, it 
appears that the administration of the testing process was proper and valid. 
In response to the first concern regarding issuance of study material, 
since all applicants were able to purchase both books if they desired, it does 
not appear that one officer had a significant advantage over others. The 
Commiosion feels, however, that Police Administration should not use possible 
candidates to handle test materials prior to a test. 
The second concern pertaining to promotability rating was evaluated by the 
Personnel Department. The issue of using supervisors from Salt Lake Metro to 
evaluate Charles Illsley appears to be relevant based on the amount of time he 
spends under their supervision opposed to West Valley City supervisors. The 
issue of Valleen Illsley being allowed to rate other candidates was evaluated 
by the Personnel Department. It appears there were no improprieties on ratings 
by Valleen Illsley. 
The concern that seniority was not considered is incorrect. In order to 
apply for the sergeant exam candidates were required to have at least four years 
of police service. This meets the state statute (10-3-1010 OCA). 
While the Commission regrets the contention this particular exam has 
created and would admonish Administration to use better judgement in the future, 
it appears that most of the concerns were addressed and answered sufficiently 
by Administration. There is concern over the fact that officers who had no 
involvement in the testing process signed the petition. The Commission feels 
that the protest of a test should be supported by those involved in the testing 
process, and not by individuals who have no direct knowledge of the facts. 
This response should be posted and made available to the entire Police 
Department staff. 
S\/A\/7 West Valley City 
^ 2 
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June 6, 1989 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Civil Service Commission 
FROM: Dennis J. Nordfelt, Police Chief 
RE: Waiver for Sergeant's Test 
The Police Department is considering offering a Sergeant's test to 
establish a promotional roster for that rank. As a result of 
this, we request that the restriction in the Civil Service 
requirements stating that officers applying for the position of 
Sergeant be of a POII rank, be waived. 
The reason 
within the 
for this request is that a number of officers currently 
department who have time in grade to be a POII rank 
were not offered the opportunity to take this promotion due to 
financial restrictions. The Department believes that there are a 
number of people in this position that are qualified and capable 
to gain the rank of Sergeant. Therefore, since the reasons for 
these officers not reaching the rank of POII qualifying them for 
test is due to the Department's inability to offer 
Lcn to them, we respectfully request that the Civil 
waive this restriction for the testing. 
the Sergeant 
such a posit 
Service Board 
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Jerrald D. Conder (#0709) 
K. C. Bennett (#3700) 
Of CONDER & WANGSGARD 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and William Salmon and David Shopay 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY FRATERNAL 
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4, a 
non-profit Utah corporation, 
and JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs- ' 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
Chief of Police, and WEST ] 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
1 DAVID N. SHOPAY 
i Civil No. 89-0907667 CV 
i Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff, David N. Shopay under oath deposes and says: 
1. My name is David N. Shopay. 
2. I have filed a Motion for Joinder requesting permission 
to join the action as a party plaintiff. 
to>!0 4 38 PH *Sl 
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3. All statements contained herein are based on my own 
personal knowledge. 
4. I have been employed since November 10, 1980, as a West 
Valley City Police Officer and hold the rank of POII. 
5. As a West Valley Police Officer, I am subject to the 
protections and rules and regulations of the West Valley Civil 
Service Merit Commission. 
6. On the date the written Sergeants examination was given, 
I had 8 years of seniority, held the rank of POII and met all of 
the other announced eligibility requirements for promotion to 
sergeant. 
7. I passed all aspects of the evaluation process and was 
placed on the promotion roster. I had more department seniority 
than anyone above me on the promotion roster. 
8. I received no points or other consideration based on my 
seniority as compared to the seniority of other qualified candi-
dates . 
9. Of the individuals on the promotion roster ahead of me, 
three of those individuals held only the rank of POI prior to time 
of the evaluation process. 
10. Had the Civil Service Merit Commission not violated the 
Open and Public Meetings Act, I would have been number 4 on the 
Page -2-
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promotion roster, even though seniority was not considered in the 
evaluation process. 
11. I was not offered the protection I believe the merit 
system and the Civil Service Merit Commission is designed to 
provide me in the promotion process, even though I signed a letter 
to the commission objecting to the improper manner in which the 
evaluation process was conducted. 
12. The rules and regulations of the West Valley Civil 
Service Merit Commission do not and did not provide me with any 
procedural rights to seek a meaningful hearing before the Commis-
sion, nor was such a hearing ever provided. 
DATED this id day of September, 1991. 
, / 
i d N". Shopay ' <? ^^7 Dav: 7 
1 9 9 1 . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s /$% day of S e p t e m b e r , 
NOTARY PUBLIC j 
SANDRA LARSEN ] 
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor j 
Sail LaKe City Utah 34111 
My Commission Expires 
January 14.1994 
STATE OF UTAH 
OTARY PUBLIC 
/; UyUZ^^L^ 
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Jerrald D. Conder (#0709) ^ 
K. C. Bennett (#3700) 
of CONDER & WANGSGARD 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and William Salmon and David Shopay 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY FRATERNAL 
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4, a y 
non-profit Utah corporation, 
and JIM CROWLEY, ' 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs- ' 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
Chief of Police, and WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 1 
Defendants. ] 
i SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
' WILLIAM SALMON 
Civil No. 89-0907667 CV 
i Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, William Salmon under oath deposes and says: 
1. My name is William Salmon. 
2. I have filed a Motion for Joinder requesting permiss.-on 
to join the action as a party plaintiff. 
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3. All statements contained herein are based on my own 
personal knowledge. 
4. I have been employed since December 6, 1982, as a West 
Valley City Police Officer and hold the rank of POII. 
5. As a West Valley Police Officer, I am subject to the 
protections and rules and regulations of the West Valley Civil 
Service Merit Commission. 
6. On the date the written Sergeants examination was given, 
I had 6i years of seniority, held the rank of POII and met all of 
the other announced eligibility requirements for promotion to 
sergeant. 
7. I passed all aspects of the evaluation process and vas 
placed on the promotion roster. I had more department seniority 
than 7 individuals above me on the promotion roster. 
8. I received no points or other consideration based on my 
seniority as compared to the seniority of other qualified candi-
dates. 
9. Of the individuals on the promotion roster ahead of me, 
three of those individuals held only the rank of POI prior to time 
of the evaluation process. 
10. Had the Civil Service Merit Commission not violated the 
Open and Public Meetings Act, I would have been number 9 on the 
Page -2-
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promotion roster, even though seniority was not considered in the 
evaluation process. 
11. I was not offered the protection I believe the merit 
system and the Civil Service Merit Commission is designed to 
provide me in the promotion process, even though I signed a letter 
to the commission objecting to the improper manner in which the 
evaluation process was conducted. 
12. The rules and regulations of the West Valley Civil 
Service Merit Commission do not and did not provide me with any 
procedural rights to seek a meaningful hearing before the Commis-
sion, nor was such a hearing ever provided. 
DATED this fO day of September, 1991. 
William Salmon 
1 9 9 1 . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s /&& d a y o f S e p t e m b e r , 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
SANDRA LARSEN 
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor i 
Salt Lake City. Utah 8 4 m 
My Commission Expires 
January 14,1894 
STATE OF UTAH 
du^yJA^ ?l4t^<L<^ 
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Jerrald D. Conder (#0709) 
K. C. Bennett (#3700) 
of CONDER & WANGSGARD 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Fax (801) 967-5563 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY FRATERNAL 
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4, a 
non-profit Utah corporation, 
and JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
Chief of Police, and WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
JIM CROWLEY 
Civil No. 89-0907667 CV 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH 
;OUNTY OF SALT LAKE) ss. 
COMES NOW Jim Crowley who, after being sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. My name is Jim Crowley. 
2. I am a plaintiff in the above-referenced action and a 
citizen of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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3. All statements made herein are based on my own personal 
knowledge• 
4. I am employed as a police officer in West Valley C? :*.y 
and have been so employed since July of 1980. 
5. 1 attained the rank of POII in approximately 1981 ,-xid 
since that time have held that rank. 
6. Presently I am a member of F.O.P. Lodge #4 and hold the 
positions of national trustee and lodge president. 
7. F.O.P. Lodge #4 is comprised of two classes of member-
ship, (a) certified peace officers, and (b) support staff em-
ployed by the West Valley City Police Department. 
8. Only certified peace officers with a rank of POII were 
entitled to promotion to the rank of sergeant. 
9. Of the 99 certified officers presently employed by t>e 
West Valley Police Department 89 are members of F.O.P. 
10. Approximately 40 individuals participated in the 
sergeant promotion process and all were members of F.O.P. Loc»<7e 
TV *X . 
11. All members of F.O.P. Lodge #4, as well as all otii^ r 
certified police officers employed by the West Valley Police 
Department, are subject to the protection and requirements .-is 
well as the specific rules and regulations of the merit system 
and the West Valley Civil Service Merit Commission. 
-2-
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12. A major purpose of F.O.P. Lodge #4 is to ensure fair 
and equal treatment of all Lodge members in their employment, 
including the promotion process, for the benefit of all Lodge 
members. 
13. I personally participated in the sergeants examination. 
14. I failed to pass the written examination by 1 point and 
was not allowed to proceed to the next level of consideration. I 
did not receive any points or consideration because of my 
seniority. 
15. Had the Commission considered seniority as required by 
state law, I believe I would have been allowed to continue in the 
promotion process 
16. At the time of the examination I had 9 years seniority. 
17. I further believe the entire testing and promotion 
process was invalid because of the illegal waiver of the POII 
requirement by the Commission in violation of the Open and Public 
Meetings Act and, further, that the Commission improperly failed 
to consider seniority in the promotion process. 
18. Had I been aware of the department's request to waive 
the POII requirement, I would have attended the meeting as a 
representative of F.O.P., and individually, to object. Because 
no meeting was held, my right, as well as F.O.P. fs right, to 
object or be heard was violated. 
-3-
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19. I signed a letter to the Commission objecting to Lne 
procedure followed in the sergeant's promotion evaluation 
process. 
20. There is no process or procedure set forth in the ru?.es 
and regulations of the Commission authorizing me or anyone else 
to appeal or seek a hearing before the Commission to object :o 
the illegalities that occurred in the evaluation process. 
DATED this /OHL day of September, 19J 
CROWLEY 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
September, 1991. 
(^6^*7%?-
/&& day or. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
SANDRA LARSEN 
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City. Utth 841 \ \ 
My CommlMiOfl Exptits 
January 1< 1694 
STATE OF UTAH 
^g^Cg^i^_^ t^y&SlsZ^z^ 
Notary Public 
-4-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE LODGE #4, a 
nonprofit Utah corporation, 
and JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
City Chief of Police, and 
WEST VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CIVIL NO. 890907667 
A Notice to Submit( having been filed, pursuant to Rule 
4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss, defendants' Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and plaintiffs' Motion for 
Joinder. The Court having reviewed the Motion, Affidavits in 
support and Reply Memorandum and the Memorandum in opposition, 
and the relevant law and being fully advised, finds good cause 
to rule as stated herein. 
0042ft 
WEST VALLEY F.O.P. V. NORDFELT PAGE TWO RULING 
Defendants' Motion to Strike plaintiffs' Supplemental 
Memorandum in Opposition to defendants' Motion to Dismiss is 
denied. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. The 
Complaint in this matter is dismissed without prejudice. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder is Denied. Because the matter 
is dismissed for plaintiffs' lack of standing, and this is not 
an adjudication on the merits of this claim; the claim is 
dismissed without prejudice. On March 23, 1992, the Court 
signed defendants' proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, Decision and Order (second draft). Pursuant to 
plaintiffs' Objection, the Court changed the Order on page 7 to 
read: "The Complaint in this matter is dismissed without 
prejudice." 
Dated this_f_2_d£y of March, 1992. 
5LIF^A. 'LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
"0429 
WEST VALLEY F.O-P. V. NORDFELT PAGE THREE RULING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, 
this .day of March, 1992: 
Jerrald D. Conder 
K. C, Bennett 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120-4099 
J. Richard Catten 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants 
3 600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
/ ^ i ^ 
<KJ430 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WES'.-? VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE LODGE #4, 
a nonprofit Utah corporation, 
ANr JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
City Chief of Police, AND WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COV5KISSION, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Civil No. 89-0907667 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
The Court, upon review of the pleadings, memoranda, 
affidavits, authorities and arguments of the parties, and being 
fulxy advised in the premises, hereby makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order 
witn respect to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Defendants' Motion 
to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and the Motion for Joinder. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about July 20, 1989, West Valley City conducted a 
promotional examination for the position of Sergeant in the West 
Valley City Police Department. 
2. One year of service with -the West Valley City Police 
Department was required in order to be eligible for promotion to 
Sergeant. 
3 • The requirements for promotion to Sergeant required that 
applicants hold the rank of Police Officer within the West Valley 
City Police Department, 
4. Within the rank of Police Officer, all grades (POI, POII 
and POIII) were eligible for promotion to Sergeant with no 
preference being given to the members of any one grade. 
5. On or about March 28, 1991, FOP members William Salmon 
and David Shopay filed a Motion for Joinder as additional 
Plaintiffs in this action. 
6. Plaintiff Jim Crowley participated in the written 
examination portion of the Sergeant promotional process. 
7. Plaintiff Jim Crowley did not receive the minimum 
required passing score on the written examination and, therefore, 
did. not proceed further in the promotional process. 
8. Plaintiff Jim Crowley did not suffer a distinct, 
particularized and palpable injury related to the conduct of 
Defendants. 
9. The Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4 (FOP) is an 
association consisting of a majority of the officers of the West 
2 
Valley City Police Department, including both officers who 
•participated in the Sergeant promotional process and officers who 
die not, 
10. Members of the FOP did not suffer distinct, 
par .'icularized and palpable injury related to the conduct of 
Descendants. 
11. Plaintiff FOP did not present its claims to the Civil 
Service Commission prior to commencement of this lawsuit. 
12. Members of the FOP were involved in formulating and 
conducting the Sergeant promotional process. 
13. Members of the FOP would lose their promotion to Sergeant 
should Plaintiff FOP's action be successful. 
14. Members of the FOP were deposed as adverse witnesses by 
Pleintiffs. 
15. Defendant Dennis Nordfelt was a member of the FOP at the 
tijv.e the action was filed and until October, 1991. 
16. On or about August 23, 1991, this matter was orally 
argued before the Court. Subsequent to that argument, Plaintiffs 
submitted a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. Defendants thereupon filed a Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby 
enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. Plaintiffs appearing before the Court must have standing 
in order to bring a lawsuit. 
3 
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2. The burden of establishing standing is upon the 
plaintiffs. 
3. To establish standing, individual plaintiffs must show 
that they have personally suffered some distinct, particularized 
and palpable injury that is related to the defendant's conduct. 
4. To establish standing, plaintiff associations must show 
that individual members of the association have suffered distinct, 
particularized and palpable injuries related to the defendant's 
conduct, thereby showing that individual members of the association 
have standing. 
5. To establish standing, plaintiff associations must show 
that the action does not require individual participation of the 
members of the association. This standard is not met if conflicts 
of interest exist within and between the association and its 
members. 
6. To establish standing, plaintiffs who challenge or seek 
review of the actions or orders of a lower commission must show 
that: 
a) the plaintiff had standing before the appropriate 
lower body; 
b) the plaintiff presented the claim to the lower 
body; 
c) a ruling by the lower body was adverse to the 
plaintiff. 
7. Plaintiff Crowley has failed, both on the face of the 
comolaint and on the facts of the case, to meet his burden to 
4 
establish that he suffered a distinct, particularized and palpable 
injury related to the conduct of Defendants, and therefore does not 
have standing in this case. 
8. Plaintiff FOP has failed, both on the face of the 
complaint and on the facts of the case, to meet its burden to 
establish that individual members of the FOP suffered distinct, 
particularized and palpable injuries related to the^ conduct of 
Detendants, and therefore does not have standing in this case. 
9. Plaintiff FOP has failed, both on the face of the 
complaint and on the facts of the case, to meet its burden to 
establish that the FOP presented its claims to the Civil Service 
Commission, and therefore does not have standing in this case. 
10. Plaintiff FOP has conflicts within and between the 
association and its members that preclude the association from 
representing its members and requires the individual participation 
of the members of the association, and therefore does not have 
standing in this case. 
11. Standing is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 
12. The Court's determination that Plaintiff FOP and 
Pldintiff Crowley do not have standing and the subsequent dismissal 
of rheir complaint renders William Salmon and David Shopay's Motion 
for Joinder moot. 
13. It is within the discretion of the Court to accept 
supplemental memoranda and affidavits provided by the parties. 
5 
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DECISION 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, it is the decision of the Court that Plaintiff FOP and 
Plaintiff Jim Crowley have not established standing necessary to 
bring this lawsuit. Based upon the facts set forth in the 
complaint, and upon a close examination of the facts of the case, 
the Court finds that Plaintiff Jim Crowley has not personally 
suffered a distinct, particularized and palpable injury related to 
Defendants' conduct which would provide him with standing in this 
case. The Court further finds that Plaintiff FOP has not 
established that individual members of the FOP have suffered 
distinct, particularized and palpable injuries related to 
Detendants' conduct. The Court further finds that clear conflicts 
of interest exist within and between the FOP association and its 
members, which prevent it from meeting the established criteria for 
standing of an association. In addition, the Court finds that the 
FOP has failed to present its claims to the appropriate lower body, 
the Civil Service Commission. 
It is the decision of the Court to accept Plaintiffs' 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss. 
It is the Decision of the Court to deny the Motion for Joinder 
since the Court has determined that Plaintiffs lack standing and 
th*> Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction over the action. 
-5-
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decision: 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED tha~ 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss is granted, and that the complaint in this matter 
is dismissed without prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Moticon 
for Joinder is denied. 
MADE and ENTERED this /(J ^ day of / 'W'^L^ , 1991, 
u?tfdg^  Leslie A. Lewis 
u()437 
